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War and Peace in the Political Culture of 
Scandinavia in the 2()th Century 
"political systems are grounded in cultures ... 
present day international relations are therefore by 
definition also intercultural relations ... " 
Adda Bozeman' 
Introduction 
Scandinavian historians are usually more 
concerned with differences between their 
countries and peoples than with 
similarities. In the tradition of 
Thucydides, Montesquieu, and 
Tocqueville, political culture has 
moreover tended to be conceived in terms 
of national characteristics. For the 
purposes of this paper, however, I shall 
take as my point of departure a broad 
conception of culture, vaguely defined as 
the ideas, norms, and values that still 
seem common to the peoples of 
Scandinavia in their thinking about war 
and peace. 
As small, militarily weak and ethnically 
fairly homogenous liberal democracies, 
living within internationally recognised 
borders, it should come as no surprise 
that the three Scandinavian states to be 
considered here should seek to promote 
peace and disarmament in their relations 
with the outside world. Already before 
the beginning of the twentieth century 
Denmark, Sweden and Norway were in 
the forefront of states that worked to 
strengthen international law, and in 
particular neutrality, as means of 
preventing war or at least their 
involvement in armed conflict. 
In 1906 the young scholar Halvdan 
Koht, later to become a renowned 
international historian and Norway's 
Foreign Minister, published a modest-
looking little book with a title that 
translates as "The Idea of Peace in 
Norwegian History. " 2 The subtitle of the 
book, more accurately reflecting its 
contents, was "Norway in the growth of 
international justice". Koht's central 
message was that the small democratic 
countries had a particular mission as 
spokesmen and pioneers for a peace built 
on justice and not on power. His attempt 
to interpret Norwegian history, right 
from the formation of the mediaeval 
Kingdom, as an endless quest for peace, 
is hardly convincing. But he clearly had a 
point when referring to Norway's 
promotion of neutrality and arbitration 
treaties from the end of the 19th century. 
In the closing passage he expressed the 
hope that Norway, together with its 
Scandinavian neighbours and 
Switzerland, would become the source 
from which peace among the peoples 
should spread through the rest of the 
world. "Peace and justice provide the 
safest shield for lands and peoples, and 
the people that make peace their purpose 
will thereby have gained an honourable 
place in the history of the world." 
This "credo" can in many ways serve 
as a common denominator for the legacy 
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of attitudes with which all three 
Scandinavian states faced the problems 
of war and peace as they entered the 
twentieth century. The basic idea for all 
of them was that "a peaceful world 
offered the best conditions for the 
continued existence of the small state." 3 
They had come to that realisation by 
quite different roads. The history of 
Swedish imperialism in the 17'h and 18'h 
centuries had for a time left lingering 
ambitions to play the role of at least a 
middle power in Enropean politics, based 
on Swedish leadership of the United 
Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway. The 
impending dissolution of that Union, 
however, put paid to those ambitions. 
Instead, the threatening presence in 
Sweden's neighbourhood of Imperial 
Russia compelled acceptance of the more 
traditional stance of a minor power, 
seeking protection from great power 
ambitions in an international system 
based on law instead of on military 
strength.' Denmark's international 
position was even more precarious, as it 
was entirely defenceless against its 
German neighbour to the south. 
Avoidance of war was therefore seen as 
the only chance of survival. Norway's 
sitnation was a different one, in that the 
country felt reasonably safe under the 
umbrella of British naval power. The 
main threat was that it might get 
dragged into a war between Great 
Britain and either of the two other great 
powers mentioned. Again, therefore, the 
country looked to a strengthened 
international legal regime as its first line 
of defence. 
The emphasis in Koht's book on the 
arbitration treaties, as well as his 
account of Norway's successful effort to 
achieve a peaceful dissolution of the 
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Union with Sweden, show a clear 
recognition that action and not just 
words was needed if Norway was to set 
an example for other states to follow. But 
Koht was no pacifist - in fact he resigned 
as chairman of the Norwegian Peace 
Association when in 1902 it voted to 
condemn even defensive wars against an 
external attacker. 
The turn of the century also saw a 
resurgence of Norwegian neutralism.s In 
part this was the old wine of isolationism 
in new bottles, nourished by suspicions 
that the Swedish King's pro-German 
leanings might involve the United 
Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway in 
foreign adventures against Norwegian 
interests. But the containing idealism was 
a new feature. The status of neutrality 
had experienced a remarkable growth 
during the nineteenth century. Relative 
peace and prosperity reigned in Europe, 
and economic liberalism favoured the 
expansion of trade without barriers of 
state interference. This, together with the 
rise of a neutral great power, the United 
States of America, provided a favourable 
climate for the development of a coherent 
legal neutrality doctrine. One important 
milestone was the Declaration of Paris in 
1856, which consecrated the old but 
never before universally recognised rules 
for the protection of neutral trade in 
wartime: namely immunity from capture 
of enemy cargo on neutral ships and 
neutral cargo on enemy ships. 
All three Scandinavian countries also 
saw important advantages for their trade 
in the strengthened legal status of 
neutrality, although this was tempered on 
Sweden's part by an occasional 
hankering after a middle power role. In 
Norway Johan Sverdrup, leader of the 
liberal "Venstre" party and Prime 
Minister from 1884, had in 1883 formed 
an association of parliamentarians to 
promote the idea of neutrality. In 1898, in 
the course of preparations for the coming 
Hague conference on international law, 
the Norwegian Parliament urged King 
Oscar 11 of Sweden and Norway to work 
for the neutralisation of the United 
Kingdoms. In the following year the new 
"Venstre" Prime Minister, Johannes 
Steen, used an Inter-Parliamentary Union 
conference in the Norwegian Capital to 
advocate a status of permanent 
neutrality for Sweden and Norway. Their 
geographic situation favoured such a 
solution. It would also, he thought, be in 
the common interest of the great powers 
if Scandinavia could be excluded from 
the contests of power politics. Of course, 
an internationally recognised status of 
permanent neutrality would also ease the 
burden of fulfilling the duties that 
accompanied the rights of neutrals. In 
1900 all the Norwegian political parties 
had permanent neutrality as part of their 
election platforms. Then, in 1902, a 
unanimous Parliament asked the Cabinet 
to open negotiations for the permanent 
neutralisation of Sweden and Norway. 
The proposal got nowhere, however, due 
to a distinct lack of enthusiasm for the 
idea in ruling Swedish circles, where a 
permanent neutrality status guaranteed 
by other powers was seen as unworthy 
for a proud and independent nation. But 
in practice the foreign policy of all three 
Scandinavian states, as the years of the 
First World War were approaching, 
would remain one of non-participation in 
alliances in peacetime, with the aim of 
preserving neutrality in time of war. 
The interwar period 
The success of the three countries in 
preserving their neutrality through the 
First World War suggested that they were 
on the right foreign policy track. Yet the 
transformation of the European order 
after the end of that war, and the 
establishment of the League of Nations, 
posed a problem. Was membership of the 
League compatible with formal 
neutrality? The burden of economic and 
military sanctions, to be imposed by the 
League against states starting wars of 
aggression, was in principle to be shared 
among the member states, and it would 
obviously be unfair to allow some states 
simply to opt out of such an obligation. In 
the event they all - now also including 
Finland - joined the League. In practice, 
it was assumed that the burden of 
participating in military action against an 
aggressor would be carried by the great 
powers. The smaller powers might, on 
request and after consultation, have to 
grant free passage to forces engaged in 
such action, and would be obliged to take 
part in a blockade or other economic 
sanctions imposed by the League. But 
seen from the Scandinavian corner of 
Europe the danger of such involvement 
seemed fairly remote. 
The League gave the minor powers an 
unprecedented opening for their voices to 
be heard on matters of international 
politics. Like many others, Norway and 
Sweden did not hesitate to make use of 
that opportunity. Based on what has been 
called a "small-state philosophy", which 
saw the minor powers as guardians of 
higher moral standards in the conduct of 
international affairs, Norway's 
representatives in the League organs 
became strident advocates of the role of 
international law in solving disputes 
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between nations. "Right instead of 
might" was the watchword. The reign of 
what Norway's Foreign Minister L'wland 
in 1905 had referred to as "the European 
warrior states" should give way to an 
international order in which conflicts 
would be resolved in an order! y and 
peaceful manner. As a "satisfied" status 
quo state, with no traditional or natural 
enemies in its neighbourhood, and no 
explosive internal cleavages that might 
threaten its integrity and cohesion, 
Norway's spokesmen in the Assembly 
seemed to suggest that all would be well 
"if only the others were like us" .6 As J.L. 
Mowinckel, one of the towering figures 
in the small circle of the Norwegian 
foreign policy establishment, said in 
reporting back to Parliament from an 
Assembly session, 
no one can suspect us of having any selfish or 
special aims or interests. It is known that we for our 
part speak from a quite objectiva love of peace, and 
from a belief that/here is among the peoples a 
growing feeling of what is right.· 
During the interwar period Norway's 
record as a pioneer for the peaceful 
settlement of international disputes 
continued to rest on a succession of 
arbitration treaties. The other great 
issue, for both Sweden and Norway, was 
disarmament. In the words of a Swedish 
historian: 
To a small state in a world of great powers. a policy 
of disarmament makes eminent sense. It is in the 
interest of the small power to strive for an 
"equalisation" of power in its vicini!}~ if possible by 
emasculating the powerful. Disarmament, arms 
control, collective securil)~ any means of 
establishing agreed-upon imernational procedures 
that can substitute ""right"" for "'might""- all such 
formulas are attractive to the small state, or at/east 
to the small "satisfied" state ·with no territorial 
ambitions or claims on others:Y 
8 IFS Info 5/03 
But such a policy has also been seen as 
"a somewhat na"ive attempt to affect 
other states by setting a good example."' 
In Norway's case, its far-reaching 
unilateral disarmament, although 
presented as a peace-building effort, had 
other reasons: the widespread feeling 
that the World War had been "the war to 
end all wars", the absence of identifiable 
external threats to Norwegian security, 
and the Labour Party's view of the 
military as a weapon against the working 
class. 
Yet Norwegians tended to view their 
country as a standard-bearer for peace, 
proudly pointing to Fridtjof Nansen's 
efforts on behalf of the League of 
Nations during the famine years in the 
Soviet Union and in the resettlement of 
refugees after the Greco-Turkish 
imbroglio. The fact that the awarding of 
the Nobel Peace Prize was entrusted to 
Norway - to a committee selected by 
Parliament - was also regarded as a 
tribute to Norway as a peacemaker. As 
for the Nobel Peace Prize, recent 
historical research has focused on the 
awards prior to the Second World War as 
a reflection of Norwegian foreign 
policy. 10 That they reflected the ideals 
that Norway hoped would prevail in 
international affairs, is clear. In fact the 
list of laureates 1901-1938 suggests a 
conception of peacemaking as principally 
the province of mostly since-forgotten 
idealist thinkers and writers, with only a 
sprinkling of practitioners such as 
Theodore Roosevelt, Austen 
Chamberlain, Aristide Briand, Gustav 
Stresemann - and Fridtjof Nansen. 
It was the gradual erosion of the 
League of Nations' will and capability to 
stem the aggressors that compelled the 
Scandinavian states to face the possibility 
of the use of military means for 
safeguarding their security. Here their 
answers differed, ranging from the Finns' 
determination to defend their newfound 
independence to the utmost, to the 
Danes' conviction that it was "neither 
desirable, nor on the balance likely-
except in extremis - that there could be 
any question of using military means for 
the preservation of Danish security 
policy interests."" In between was 
Sweden, which - albeit without feeling 
particularly threatened - still retained a 
conviction that a military defence 
capability was a necessary deterrent 
against aggression. Hence there was 
a continued Swedish commitment to general 
disarmament together l'>'ith efforts to strengthen 
collective securil)~ but also a program of national 
rearmament and efforts to build regional security by 
attempting to create a Nordic "sanctuary"- 12 
In Norway's case the decline of the 
League of Nations coincided with the 
advent to power of the Labour Party. Its 
anti-military stance seemed firmly 
established, and the trust in British naval 
power as a sufficient deterrent against 
aggression from other great powers was 
widespread through the whole political 
spectrum. Thus it was only from 1937 
onwards that the Labour government 
agreed to fairly substantial extraordinary 
budget allocations for defence. This was 
a response to increasingly dire warnings 
from the military authorities about the 
miserable state of the country's armed 
forces. The Commander-in-Chief of the 
Army in the autumn of 1937 had 
described the army as without 
comparison the worst trained and most 
poorly equipped in the whole of Europe. 
The Admiralty Staff painted a similar 
picture as regards the navy, and 
emphasised the consequent danger that 
Norway might be unable to prevent acts 
of war within her maritime territory, 
whether in the form of one party's 
warships attacking its enemy's ships, or if 
Germany should seek to obtain naval 
bases on the Norwegian coast. 
The only political party that showed 
some enthusiasm for the demands of the 
military was the Conservative "Hcyre" 
Party. The other major opposition party, 
the Liberals, or "Venstre", supported the 
government's line. With former Prime 
Minister J .L. Mowinckel as their 
principal spokesman on foreign affairs, 
the Liberals did not share Labour's 
ideological aversion to the military. 
Instead, they put their faith in the 
traditional protection that British naval 
superiority in the North Sea provided 
against incursions from any other power 
such as Germany. As late as in May 
1939, at a secret session of the Stoning, 
Mowinckel claimed that with its much 
weaker navy now than in the First World 
War, Germany could not hope to 
maintain an air or naval base on the 
Norwegian coast against British naval 
power. In this view he was supported by 
no less an authority than the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, 
Admiral Henry Diesen. In a newspaper 
interview earlier that year he said that 
anyone wishing to seize a point on the 
coast had to be master of the seas, and if 
he was then he had no need to do so. 
That danger was therefore "highly 
exaggerated". 
From World War to Cold War 
Of the four Nordic countries, only 
Sweden was able to preserve its 
neutrality during the Second World War. 
Finland, having been attacked by the 
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Soviet Union in December 1939, was a 
eo-belligerent with Germany against the 
Soviet Union from 1941 to 1944. 
Denmark and Norway were invaded by 
Germany in April 1940, but whereas 
Denmark surrendered without offering 
any resistance, Norway fought a two-
month campaign with the aid of the 
Western alliance. Then, with the home 
country under occupation, the 
government sought refuge in the United 
Kingdom and carried on the armed 
struggle as a member of the Grand 
Alliance. 
Those different experiences were bound 
to make their mark on the attitude to war 
and peace in their political culture. In 
Sweden it strengthened the conviction 
that the maintenance of non-alignment 
required strong defence preparedness. In 
Finland, an undiminished determination 
to preserve its independence had to be 
tempered by the realisation that to do so 
required accommodation to the demands 
of a non-confrontational coexistence with 
the Soviet Union. The Norwegians and 
the Danes, however, realised that their 
security would henceforth depend on a 
combination of a national defence effort 
and assistance from the Western Great 
Powers. 
At first, during the 1950s, questions of 
war and peace had little direct impact on 
political culture in the Scandinavian 
countries. The people seemed to accept 
that the tensions between East and West 
made it necessary to build up a strong 
military preparedness. In Norway, 
opinion polls showed a clear acceptance 
of the need for a strong defence effort, 
and support of Norway's membership of 
the Atlantic Alliance remained solid 
throughout the Cold War. The Soviet 
Union was seen as the greatest threat to 
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world peace and to Norwegian security, 
although many retained the traditional 
suspicion of great power politics as such. 
Overall, the political culture of 
Scandinavia retained a traditional 
scepticism towards great power politics. 
In the case of Norway, Johan Galtung in 
a study of opinion polls found that while 
there was a strong bias in favour of the 
western powers, there were nuances: 
There was a general scepticism towards 
great powers, including many critical 
attitudes towards the United States - in 
some cases the assessments of the US and 
the Soviet Union were almost symmetric. 
Attitudes towards the Soviet Union also 
had many positive features. There was 
moreover no unconditional approval of 
all western countries: much scepticism 
prevailed towards Germany and 
France." For Denmark too "the fear of 
abandonment and the quest for 
protection" had motivated the decision to 
join the alliance, and those motives 
continued to hold sway against the 
traditional small-power fear of losing 
one's freedom of action in an alliance 
dominated by great powers." At the 
same time there was in all three 
Scandinavian countries strong support 
for the United Nations, and a very 
favourable attitude towards the active 
participation of their countries' military 
in UN peacekeeping. 
Sweden's determination to remain non-
aligned made it a special case. Although 
it would ultimately have to rely on 
assistance from the Western powers in 
case of Soviet aggression, the absence of 
any alliance commitment meant a 
proportionately greater national defence 
build-up. And as soon as the Soviet Union 
developed nuclear weapons, Sweden 
faced the question of developing its own 
nuclear deterrent. It was not until the 
early 1960s that the Swedish government 
finally relinquished that option. In the 
meantime a protest movement against 
nuclear weapons, that not least was 
directed against Sweden's own nuclear 
option, had gathered important support 
within the ruling Social Democrats. This 
put Sweden in the curious situation that 
even while pondering whether to become 
the world's fourth nuclear power, 
Swedish Foreign Minister Osten Unden 
began to make his mark at the United 
Nations as a prominent spokesman for 
disarmament, including nuclear 
disarmament. On the face of it, Swedish 
advocacy of disarmament meant a 
continuation of Swedish inter-war policy. 
But there was a difference: Disarmament 
had now become "a policy almost 
exclusively directed at others",IS 
In the two Scandinavian Nato member 
states the economic burden of military 
expenditures, and the political burden of 
a commitment to an increasingly 
militarised alliance, began to surface 
from the late 1950s. The opposition was 
not so much against the alliance as such 
- a clear majority in both countries 
remained steadfast in their support of 
Nato membership. It was only from the 
beginning of the 1960s, however, that 
protest movements became an 
increasingly prominent aspect of 
Scandinavian political culture. Nuclear 
weapons were a principal target, in 
Norway beginning with protest marches 
against nuclear tests that raised the 
spectre of widespread contamination of 
the atmosphere. Norwegians' fears in 
that respect were enhanced as the Soviet 
Union moved their bomb tests to Novaya 
Zemlya in the Barents Sea, a few 
hundred kilometres from Norwegian 
territory. On 30 October 1961, the tests 
reached their climax with the detonation 
of a 50-megaton "Superbomb". 
It has been said that through those 
campaigns the young generation entered 
the political arena for the first time. 
Their protest movement was not pacifist 
by nature, and, although dominated by 
the left wing of the political spectrum, 
their leaders made strenuous efforts to 
show that the campaign had all countries 
with nuclear weapons as their target. Yet 
in Norway the Socialist Peoples' Party, 
formed in 1961 by members of the left 
wing of the ruling Labour Party, soon 
became a standard-bearer for neutralist 
sentiments, with "Norway out of Nato" 
as one of their slogans. Later in the 1960s 
America's war in Vietnam came to 
dominate as the target for the protest 
marches, followed in the early 1970s by 
the strident and ultimately successful 
movement against Norwegian 
membership of the European 
Communities (or the Common Market as 
it was usually called). 
Through the rest of the 1970s solidarity 
with the Third World, and campaigns to 
save the environment, dominated the 
agenda of popular protest. Bur at the end 
of that decade protests against nuclear 
weapons again took centre stage, now 
directed for the most part against US and 
Nato plans to equip Western Europe with 
medium and short-range nuclear missiles 
as a counter to Soviet deployments of the 
SS-20 missile. This time women's 
organisations and religious groups were 
also mobilised, and the movement had the 
support of many voters at the centre of 
the political spectrum. In 1979 a well-
organised campaign began under the 
slogan "No to nuclear weapons", which 
in a short time gained 100 000 members. 
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Their petition in favour of a Nordic 
nuclear-free zone and against nuclear 
weapons on Norwegian soil even in 
wartime gathered half a million 
signatures - about one-eighth of the 
population. The turmoil in Denmark was 
even more intense. For almost a decade 
from 1979 Denmark's relationship with 
Nato was, according to a Danish 
historian, "crisis-ridden": The country 
experienced "an escalating security 
debate spearheaded by a burgeoning 
peace movement. " 16 
There is no denying that Scandinavian 
scepticism towards the great powers and 
great power policies was admixed with a 
tinge of their own moral superiority, an 
attitude which led the Swedes in 
particular to entertain ideas about their 
country as a "moral great power" Y In 
practical politics, a certain "missionary 
impulse" was manifested in all three 
countries' advocacy of development aid 
to the Third World, and their efforts to 
strengthen the role of the United Nations. 
In addition, grassroot feelings about the 
futility of a never-ending arms race, and 
revulsion against the spectre of a war 
fought with nuclear weapons, were 
strong, and soon corn pelled the 
governments of the two countries that 
were members of Nato to seek to 
influence their allies in favour of a 
reduction of cold war tensions. In 
Denmark the opposition resulted in 
forcing the government to append 
footnotes of reservation to aspects of 
policy declarations from the councils of 
Nato. The Norwegians, on the other 
hand, whose territory was strategically 
more exposed, concentrated on 
persuading Nato to combine assurances 
of military assistance with a policy that 
was meant to reassure its Soviet 
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neighbour of the strictly defensive 
purpose of the alliance. Only when East-
West tensions reached a new pitch, 
during what has come to be known as the 
"second Cold War", from the late 
seventies, did Norway reach the brink of 
becoming another "footnote country". 
In fact, during the early 1980s, the 
policies of the three Scandinavian 
countries seemed to converge in a way 
that had not been seen since the 1920s. 
Partly spurred by the coming into power 
in Sweden of the government of Olof 
Palme in 1982, with its formula of "an 
active peace and disarmament policy", 
but also inspired by a strong tradition of 
opposition to nuclear weapons, the three 
countries came close to forming a united 
anti-nuclear-weapons front. The salient 
feature was the proposal for a Nordic 
non-nuclear zone, originally proposed by 
the Soviet Union in the late 1950s, and 
renewed by Finland's President Urho 
Kekkonen in 1963. The idea, in 
Kekkonen 's view, was to keep the area 
outside of international tensions. If it had 
been realised, it would have been a 
remarkable completion of a circle 
originating in the efforts of the interwar 
period of insulating the Nordic area from 
great power confrontations. But 
Norway's and Denmark's need to 
demonstrate solidarity with their Nato 
allies in the end carried the day. 
Postscript 
Scandinavian positions toward the war/ 
peace conundrum in the post-cold war 
period has hardly been touched upon by 
the historians. What can be attempted 
here is therefore not more than a 
journalistic sketch of some salient 
features. The first crossroads came with 
the first Gulf War in 1991. Public opinion 
in Scandinavia was divided as to what 
should be their countries' response to US 
calls to join the coalition against Saddam 
Hussein. While Iraq's invasion of its 
small neighbour was roundly condemned, 
the prospect of actually participating in a 
war in the Middle East presented a major 
moral hurdle. The problem presented 
itself in its most acute form for the two 
Nato members Denmark and Norway, 
torn between their reluctance to take up 
arms "out of area" and their need to 
show solidarity with their allies. In the 
end they did participate in the military 
campaign, albeit on a very minor scale. 
The Persian Gulf, after all, was "a far 
away country of which we know very 
little" -to paraphrase Chamberlain's 
comment about Czechoslovakia in 1938. 
The next crossroads was former 
Yugoslavia- still "out of area" in Nato 
terms, yet much closer to home. Here 
Denmark and Norway got involved right 
from the beginning, since the intervention 
of foreign military forces was initially a 
United Nations peacekeeping affair and 
therefore well in line with Scandinavian 
traditions of support for the UN. After 
heavy Scandinavian participation in 
UNPROFOR, in which Sweden was also 
included, the engagement of their forces 
continued through the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, beginning with IFO R and 
carried on through SFOR. The relative 
lack of internal opposition to the 
presence of their forces in a warlike 
situation can be explained by the gradual 
transition from peacekeeping to peace 
enforcement with UN authorisation, 
although under Nato auspices. 
The third - and rather more 
problematic - crossroads was Kosovo, 
and the war against Yugoslavia. 
Norwegian participation in that war was 
a hotly debated issue, and the 
government's dilemma is aptly illustrated 
by the Prime Minister's refusal, at the 
time, to refer to Nato's action as "a 
war". Only this year has he publicly 
admitted that he should, in fact, have 
used that word to describe what the 
Norwegian forces were being committed 
to. The public opposition subsided for a 
while, influenced by images of Serbian 
atrocities, but re-ignited at the sight of 
Nato aircraft bombing infrastructure 
targets in Serbia itself, involving civilian 
casualties. But the majority of the 
Norwegian public remained firm in its 
acceptance of the participation of 
Norwegian forces, in numbers eventually 
reaching 7000 men in KFOR plus a flight 
of fighter-bombers operating out of an 
Italian airbase. 
The fourth crossroads was Afghanistan. 
When Nato member countries were asked 
to contribute forces, in the aftermath of 
the US-led war against the Taliban, both 
Norway and Denmark answered the call, 
providing small detachments of special 
forces as well as fighter-bombers 
operating together from a Kirgizstan 
airbase. Opposition from elements of the 
left wing flared at the news that 
Norwegian aircraft had actually dropped 
bombs, killing people on the ground. But 
on the whole Norway's still continuing 
participation in that war appears to have 
been accepted by the public. 
The fifth, and so far the last, crossroads 
came with the question of participation in 
the restoration of peace and order in 
Iraq. While both Denmark and Norway 
now have small detachments of army 
engineers in the country, the debate is 
still about the wisdom of such 
participation. Parties on the left of the 
political spectrum point to the fact that 
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Norway was against the US/UK invasion 
of Iraq, since it was not sanctioned by the 
United Nations, and hence have called 
for the withdrawal of the Norwegian 
soldiers there. But the government has 
stood firm, pointing to the work of the 
army engineers as being aid to the Iraqi 
people. 
In all, the five crossroads sketched here 
suggest that the post-cold war period 
may turn out to be of considerable 
interest for a study of the developing 
Scandinavian attitudes to the war/peace 
conundrum. Few would ten years ago 
have predicted that our forces would be 
participating in wars or warlike activities 
in areas that could not, by any stretch of 
the imagination, be said to be a 
contribution to the territorial defence of 
the Scandinavian homelands. How that 
transition has come about promises to be 
a fascinating case study in the evolution 
of Scandinavian political culture. 
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